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COMMENTARY
LIMITS OF JUSTICE: THE COURTS' ROLE IN SCHOOL DESEGREGA
TION. By Howard I. Kalodner and James J. Fishman. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Ballinger 1978.

Reviewed by Mark C. Yudof*
LIMITS OF JUSTICE is an ambitious book that seeks to ground
the study of desegregation decisions in an empirical methodology.
The eight case studies in the volume, sandwiched between an in
troductory essay by Dean Kalodner and some concluding com
ments by distinguished civil rights commentators,l draw on the le
gal realist tradition of attentiveness to facts, social implications,
social context, and rules in action rather than in the abstract;2 and
on more modem notions of implementation research in the social
sciences. 3 Dean Kalodner's essay appears premised on the notion
that traditional modes of enforcing and monitoring court deseg
regation decrees may not be efficacious-that the results of these
paper decrees are fur from preordained. The assumption is that
the implementation of court decrees into school systems and the
formation of rules and policies are worth studying precisely be
cause the outcomes are virtually uncertain and unpredictable. It is
one that also characterizes the modem implementation literature:
The article of faith that unites implementation analysts is a belief
that the carrying out of a policy, the installation of a plan, or the
enforcement of a law is neither automatic nor assured. On the
contrary, both casual observations and systematic investigation
suggest that the outcomes of social policies and innovative plans
generally have been unpredictable and unfortunate, at least in

* John S. Redditt Professor of Law, University of Texas at Austin. B.A. 1965,
LL.B. 1968, University of Pennsylvania.
1. Derrick A. Bell, Jr. and Forbes Bottomly.
2. See generally T. BENDITT, LAW AS RULE AND PRINCIPLE (1978); G.
GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977); E. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF
DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1973); Stevens, Two Cheers for 1870: The American Law
School, in LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 405 (D. Fleming & B. Bailyn eds. 1971).
3. See, e.g., G. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN
MISSILE CRISIS (1971); E. BARDACH, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME (1977); A.
GOULDNER, PATTERNS OF INDUSTRIAL BUREAUCRACY (1965); H. KAUFMAN, THE
FOREST RANGER (1960); J. PRESSMAN & A. WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION (1973).
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the eyes of the designers. Academic research seeks to under
stand and explain this uncertainty in outcomes; policy research
aims to do something about it.4

The difficulty of this approach, of course, lies in the execution of
the case study technique in the field of school desegregation. The
desire to move beyond theorizing based on the stargazing variety
to theorizing grounded in the harsh realities of race relations in
public school systems is not easily fulfilled.
The contributors to LIMITS OF JUSTICE exhibit markedly dif
ferent abilities to utilize successfully the case study technique. As
Paul Berman remarked generally about implementation studies:
[T]he literature consists mainly of atheoretical case studies of
varying quality-some extraordinarily perceptive, others disap
pointingly dull-whose claims to generality are questionable be
cause the cases cannot easily be compared. . . . Reviewing a
wide sample of these retrospective studies leaves one feeling
somehow wiser but still uncertain as to how to apply this wis
dom in other than the special circumstances already past. . . . In
brief, implementation analysis lacks a conceptual framework that
places individual studies within their larger sectoral context and
facilitates cross-sectoral comparisons. 5

It is often easy to lose one's way as one encounters, with tedious
regularity, the references to demographic trends, the decline of
white school populations in urban school systems, the resistance of
school boards and school professionals to desegregation orders, the
blow by blow (motion by motion, appeal by appeal) elaboration of
court decisions, and the political scrutiny of each of the selected
school systems. If idle theorizing, devoid of social and political re
ality, is a sin, it does not make the unstructured, non-conceptual
regurgitation of facts a virtue. Professors Robertson and Teitelbaum
surely must be right when they argue that empirical studies are
"merely the compost for the construction of a theoretical frame
work,"6 a theoretical framework that explains relationships and out
comes and yields insights into improving the implementation pro
cess. Without some relationship to theory, all that is left is the
compost.
Perhaps one should not be too demanding of case studies, par
4. Berman, The Study of Macro- and Micro-Implementation, 26 PUB. POL'y
157, 160 (1978).
5. Id. at 158-59.
6. Robertson & Teitelbaum, Optimizing Legal Impact: A Case Study in Search
of a Theory, 1973 WIS. L. REV. 665, 667.
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ticularly those involving complex legal and social problems like
school desegregation. It is easy to criticize, but much more difficult
to criticize constructively. There is a tendency (or perhaps it is
simply a reflection of my own thinking) to look to the physical sci
ences for paradigms about ordering the world, determining the rel
evancy of facts, deciding what to investigate, and explaining rela
tionships.7 In addressing the philosophy of scientific revolutions,
Kuhn, in the context of the physical sciences, speaks of inves
tigating facts for three reasons: 1) To illuminate those facts which
are particularly revealing of the underlying paradigm; 2) to use the
facts as a basis for checking the predictions of the paradigm; and 3)
to undertake empirical work which assists in the refinement of the
paradigm and in the resolution of its residual ambiguities. 8 The
case study in the social, political, and legal realm appears far from
achieving such coherence. Case studies often multiply theories
and, cpnsequently, bring disagreement rather than consensus on
underlying propositions. The further accumulation of facts under
such circumstances may simply increase the number of mysteries
and throw further doubt on the already pluralistic character of so
cial science wisdom. 9 Prediction and refinement are often
casualties of social science progress, not by-products. 10
There is no reason to believe that a group of extremely able,
empirically oriented lawyers can undo these heady difficulties. At
best they should be held to modest standards of illuminating fre
quently ignored aspects of the desegregation process which may
tell us something, however little, about the different ways in which
school segregation problems may be resolved by legal institutions
operating in a rich political, economic, and social framework of in
stitutions and groups.ll
Dean Kalodner has taken pains to narrow the scope of the en
terprise which he co-edits. In his introductory essay, he asks how
7. See generally T. KUHN, THE STRUcrURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d
ed. 1970).
8. H. KALODNER & J. FISHMAN, LIMITS OF JUSTICE: THE COURTS' ROLE IN
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 25-28 (1978) [hereinafter cited by page number only].
9. See generally Cohen & Weiss, Social Science and Social Policy: Schools and
Race, in EDUCATION, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (R. Anson & R.
Rist eds. 1977).
10.

Id.

11. See, e.g., E. CATALDO, M. GILES, & D. GATLIN, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
POLICY (1978); R. CRAlN, THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1969); Kirp,
Block, Myers, Gamble & Koshar, Why Desegregation Didn't Happen: Race & School
ing in Oakland, 87 SCH. REV. 355 (1979).
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the courts may eliminate the vestiges of segregated school systems.
He notes with regret the "flight" of the federal government from
such matters,12 and the tendency of "many school boards [to] pur
sue from the outset a course designed to shift the entire political
burden of desegregation on the courtS."13 His framework is re
markably instrumental. The question is not so much whether a
school district· or state has committed de jure segregation or
whether racially balanced schools within a particular geographic
area are a constitutionally required remedy. The question is how to
achieve a racial balance remedy once a violation of the fourteenth
amendment has been found. How can courts make school boards
and school bureaucracies cooperate in the objective? How can
white flight be alleviated? How can the social costs of integration
be reduced? How can compliance with a desegregation decree be
monitored? How may the conditions for a quality, integrated edu
cation for black and white students be achieved?
In this light, Dean Kalodner makes detailed proposals for the
use of experts early-on in the litigation to facilitate the fashioning of
remedies. 14 He is concerned with the role and function of mas
ters 15 and state and federal executive branch agencies lS acting as
court appointed monitors; and he focuses on the role of attorneys
representing both school boards and plaintiffs. 17 In short, he
searches for ways in which "the adjudication process could be im
proved in its functioning. "18 His analysis is careful and balanced.
He recognizes limits in the nature of adjudication, but does not
seek to tum courts into administrative agencies. 19 On the other
hand, the fact that solutions to "broad social problems must come
from the legislative and executive branches of government"20 does
not counsel judicial inaction: "[F]or all of the faults that have char
acterized adjudication, it is not possible to conceive of a constitu
tional system in which no institution of government is prepared to
12. Pp.2-3.
13. P.3.
14. P.19.
15. Pp. 8-11, 19-20.
16. P. 21. Dean Kalodner is more dubious about the propriety of "court-created
committees of citizens or parents": "Where the court chooses a citizen monitoring
panel, there is generated a transfer of power from the school board to parents or
other interested citizens. While such a shift may be politically justifiable, the role of
the court in producing it is of doubtful validity." Id.
17. Pp.21-22.
18. P.23.
19. See pp. 22-23.
20. P.23.
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declare and enforce constitutional rights. "21 His proposals involve
the improvement of the adjudication process without altering "the
essential character of the role of courts in school desegregation liti
gation. "22 Walking a tightrope, he perceives an inverse relationship
between the failure of political leadership in desegregation cases
and the expanding equity jurisdiction of the courts in such cases:
It is when the court is able to define the constitutional right to
an education free of discriminatory school board action-and
then confidently to expect the school board, the state commis
sioner of education, or other state or federal officials or agencies
to formulate and implement the requisite changes to implement
that right-that the role of courts can be reduced to more tradi
tional dimensions. The failure of political leadership to play that
proper role has led to the expansion of equity jurisdiction; only a
reversal of that failure will lead to the contraction of equity juris
diction. 23

There are ambiguities in the Kalodner analysis, ambiguities of
which he is painfully aware. The instrumental approach makes
sense only if the objective is clearly stated or understood (and if
there are not multiple and conflicting objectives) and if the costs of
alternative means can be calculated in relation to the benefits. This
is not the case in school desegregation litigation. The courts have
vacillated on the need and justification for racial balance remedies
and on the degree of state involvement in school segregation nec
essary to trigger a finding of a constitutional violation-ranging
from adoption of neighborhood pupil assignment plans which
predictably result in segregation to explicit separation of the
races. 24 The target is a moving one, and the ends of the process
are often subsumed by the process itself. The need for ongoing ju
dicial supervision, the extraordinary breadth of the remedies, the
complex nature and future orientation of the factfinding, and the
multiparty structure of desegregation litigation make it far from
21.
TEREST
L. REv.
decrees
units).
22.
23.

Id. Kirp, School Desegregation and the Limits of Legalism, 47 PUB. IN
101 (1977); cf. Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Returners, 35 WASH. & LEE
949 (1978) (discussion of the proliferation and regularization of institutional
where courts have become judicial overseers of state and local governmental
Pp. 23-24.
P.24.

24. See generally M. Yudof, School Desegregation: Legal Realism, Reasoned
Elaboration, and Social Science Research in the Supreme Court (publication pending
in Law & Contemporary Problems). Compare Keyes v. School Dist. No.1, 413 U.S.
189 (1973), with Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977).

696

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1:691

clear whether traditional litigation models can be shaped to the
new exigencies. 25
Unfortunately, many of the case studies in LIMITS OF JUSTICE
lack the self-conscious incrementalism of Dean Kalodner's approach
and ignore the ambiguities of the school desegregation process.
With rare exception, the case study authors embrace the racial bal
ance remedy without qualms and proceed to divide the world into
good guys and bad guys-those who favor integration and those
who do not. Perhaps the worst offender is Professor Smith. In
analyzing the Boston desegregation case,26 his presentation closely
resembles an advocate's brief. Pre-1960's racism in Boston is dealt
with in a cavalier fashion in less than six pages. Along the way, the
Massachusetts Racial Imbalance Act, the distinction between de
jure and de facto segregation, and the abolitionist movement are
all but forgotten. The reader is told of lawless cops who will not
maintain order, of "obstinate" boards of education, and of recalci
trant white interest groups. "Community" appears to mean the mi
nority community (or at least parts of it) and not the political com
munity from which public officials are elected. If this served the
purpose of illuminating the problems of desegregation, perhaps the
presentational bias may be overlooked. But it is not the case. With
all seriousness, the reader learns that there are difficulties in
relying on the wrongdoers (school officials) for desegregation plans,27
members of the Citywide Coordinating Council (a monitoring
agency appointed by the court) brought "the hardened perspectives
and positions of their constituencies" with them,28 the treatment of
children is a volatile issue, desegregation remedies affect persons
other than the wrongdoers, desegregation decrees bring resistance
and polarization, and a 24-month old judicial decree cannot change
two centuries of interracial hostility. 29 In short, a restatement of
the problems substitutes itself for analysis.
The pattern of the Smith case study is repeated in a number
of the other case studies. For example, Jessica and Jeffrey Pearson
opine that the Denver school board's response to black migration
to traditionally white neighborhoods "was to maintain racial segre
25. See generally Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
DAN

HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1976); Mishkin, supra note 21; cf. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST
GEROUS BRANCH (1962) (discussing the judicial branch of the government).

26. Pp. 25-113.
27. Pp. 105-08.
28. P.109.
29. Pp. 110-13.
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gation in the schools in the wake of neighborhood change."3o
Whether the neighborhood was white, integrated (even for a brief
transitional period), or black, the school system maintained neigh
borhood schools. The authors do not explain why this should pro
vide the basis for a finding of constitutional wrongdoing. What is
the significance of going from overwhelmingly white to overwhelm
ingly black schools? Why is racial balance the objective? What
might the school authorities have done? How does a school system
prevent an integrated neighborhood from becoming predominantly
minority? Or should it abandon neighborhood assignment policies?
How would that policy alter demographic trends?
Pearson and Pearson also argue that "the personal socio
economic and ideological composition of school board members and
the politicization of civil rights issues both explain why resistance
to school desegregation hardened so dramatically. "31 In fact they ex
plain remarkably little. The question is not whether high socio
economic or low socioeconomic status individuals are "liberal" on
race matters, but why those committed to integration are fre
quently evicted from office only to be replaced by "anti-busing"
public officials. The socioeconomic status of board members is not
the independent variable in the analysis. Issues are not fortuitously
politicized such that resistance to desegregation is increased.
Politicization is itself a manifestation of resistance. If there is a les
son to be drawn from the Denver experience (and that of many
other school systems), it is that board members are frequently
placed under enormous pressure to resist racial balancing of the
schools; and they either succumb to those pressures or pay a high
political price.
The book is filled with tales of the decisions of progressive
boards of education· being overturned by less progressive successor
boards. Desegregation resolutions were rescinded in Denver,
Detroit, Dayton, and other cities, according to Professor Hain. 32
Ironically, this often compels plaintiffs to rely on the actions of a
pro-desegregation board to build a case of de jure segregation
against its successor. This sometimes leads to the bizarre result
that cities with relatively progressive leadership on school and race
matters are taken to court before those that have unambiguously
engaged in racial discrimination. The precipitating event is the re
30.
31.
32.

P.218.
P.219.
P. 244 & n.101.
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scission, but despite the assertions of Pearson and Pearson to the
contrary,33 it is far from clear that such rescissions, by themselves,
constitute discriminatory state action for purposes of the fourteenth
amendment. 34 With the exception of Professor Hain's work on the
Detroit desegregation case, the case studies in LIMITS OF JUSTICE
all but ignore this frequently repeated political and legal pattern.
The failure to treat the causes of politicization and anti-bUSing
attitudes in the Denver case study is particularly disturbing in the
light of the authors' emphasis on the alleged success of the Com
munity Education Council in monitoring the Denver desegregation
order. Once again, as in the Boston case, there is a court-ap
pointed group of community monitors. This time, however, the
reader is told that they get the job done. Why is that? How is
Denver different from Boston? Because "the network [of monitors]
draws from a cross-section of the community. It reaches into every
school. ... [T]he network is the community."35 If the Community
Education Council is truly representative of the community (could
it be the community?), one would expect it to act like the Denver
school board that rescinded the voluntary desegregation plans. If it
successfully monitors the desegregation remedy, presumably this is
because it is not representative of the larger community or it rep
resents sympathetic constituent interests. Indeed, judicial interven
tion in desegregation issues is premised largely on the notion that
minority groups cannot successfully press their constitutional and
educational interests in the political arena of the legislative and ex
ecutive branches of government. Pearson and Pearson would have
it both ways. Community resistance to desegregation expressed
through the political processes counts for little,36 while court se
lected monitors are perceived as representing the real political
community.
Another questionable aspect of a number of the case studies
relates to generalizations about the educational disadvantages asso
ciated with segregated schools (particularly for minority children)
and the benefits associated with integration. 37 Organization theo
33. P.220.
34. The Supreme Court ducked the issue in Keyes v. School Dist. No.1, 413
U.S. 189 (1973) and Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977). Reitman
v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); cf. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (dis
cussing the degree of state involvement needed to find violations of the fourteenth
amendment).
35. Pp. 221-22.
36. See p. 214.
37. Consider this remarkable statement in the Denver case study:
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rists have frequently warned that there are distinctive organiza
tional characteristics to public sector social service delivery systems
such as education; the task is usually labor intensive and the output
criteria are ambiguous as compared to private sector markets. 38
Virtually all of the authors, except for Professor Kirp, appear una
ware of this organizational literature, and some fall into the trap of
failing to take into account the difficulty of specifying educational
outcomes and their causes. Professor Smith, without documenta
tion, describes the quality of education in Boston after the
desegregation order as "vastly improved. "39 He fails to explain how
or why it is improved and ignores the sorry circumstances of the
implementation process.
.
James Fishman, in an otherwise insightful case study of the ef
forts to desegregate the Ma~k Twain elementary school in Brook
lyn,40 asserts that segregation may be proven by reference to
demographic patterns, board action and inaction, and educational
failures:
Proof of segregation in fact and that the segregation was caused
by school board action and inaction was relatively easy. The
demographics spoke for themselves. The dreary record of com
munity board inaction was not contradicted....
. . . The court visited the school. Combined with the staAlthough it is difficult to gauge the quality of a school district, various
impressionistic evaluations as well as statistical indicators suggest an erosion
of educational quality. During the past several years, for example, the teach
er turnover rate in the Denver school district has consistently declined. This
is largely attributed to the improved salary schedule negotiated in 1969
which rewarded career teachers and reduced teacher mobility. At the same
time the pupil-teacher ratio has steadily dropped from 24 pupils per teacher
in 1969 to 19.3 pupils in 1975. These indicators suggest improved quality.
On the negative side, however, the student drop-out rate has risen from
5.5 percent in 1971/72 to 6.6 percent in 1972/73 to 7.B percent in 1973/74 to
B.5 percent in 1974175. Pupil achievement test scores have dropped in these
years, and students in more and more of the district's schools fail to meet or
exceed national achievement norms. Furthermore, public satisfaction with
the school district has also eroded. More recent achievement test compari
sons covering the 1972-1975 period, however, fail to suggest continued pat
terns of decline.
Pp. IBO-Bl (footnotes omitted).
3B. See Berman, supra note 4, at 174-75 (citing J. THOMPSON, ORGANIZATIONS
IN AMERICA (1967)) (additional citations omitted).
39. P. llO.
40. Pp. 115-65. For example, Fishman notes that the school board "frequently
misunderstood the legal process and the use of counsel." P. 130. Board members re
acted to litigation by use of press conferences and by seeking to talk-out the problem
with the judge as a fellow politician. Id.
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tistics relating to reading scores, feeder patterns, utilization [of
school capacity], indicators of intraschool segregation, the fact of
segregation was irrefutable. 41

Perhaps the reference to declining reading scores was simply an
oversight. If the suggestion is that low reading scores are a conse
quence of segregation, it is certainly a debatable point42 and one
which is not supported by the Fishman case study. Minority group
reading scores are generally below those of whites,43 and the role
of segregation and integration in the causal chain is not clear. This
does not mean, as Professor Bell seems to suggest in his commen
tary, that integration is not worth the candle because Brown v.
Board of Education 44 and its progeny are addressed primarily to
educational quality,45 but that such outcome data are irrelevant to
the determination of a constitutional wrong. 46 At the remedy stage,
educational quality concerns seem more appropriate, and Fishman
is quite correctly concerned with such matters under the "magnet"
school concept developed to integrate the Mark Twain School:
Nor is there great concern. in the final order over the educa
tion that blacks will receive in the other schools. . . . Extra re
sources will go into Mark Twain to ensure the success of the
magnet. But in a financially deprived school system, are there
funds to go around for all kinds of students?
There will be neither the resources nor the individuals to create
another magnet school [if another school in the district begins to
tip in its racial balance].47

Perhaps the lesson to be learned is that the adjudication process
fragments public policymaking. Courts resolve the dispute before
them without thinking through the systemic consequences of their
41.
42.

Pp. 131-32.
See generally N. ST. JOHN, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: OUTCOMES FOR
CmLDREN (1975); M. WEINBERG, MINORITY STUDENTS: A RESEARCH ApPRAISAL
(1977).
43. See, e.g., note 42 supra.
44. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). J. COLEMAN, E. CAMPBELL, J. MCPORTLAND, A.
MOOD, F. WEINFELD & R. YORK, EQUAUTY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966);
C. JENCKS, M. SMITH, H. ACLAND, M. BANE, D. COHEN, H. GINTIS, B. HEYNS & S.
MICHELSON, INEQUAUTY (1972); ON EQUAUTY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (F.

Mosteller & D. Moynihan eds. 1972).
45. Pp. 570-71.
46. See Yudof, supra note 24; Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and the
Courts, 51 TEX. L. REV. 411 (1973).
47. P.165.

1979]

LIMITS OF JUSTICE

701

orders. 48 A diversion of resources and gifted students to one inte
grated school inevitably tears them away from other schools in the
system. The overall quality of education for the vast majority of stu
dents, at least as measured by resources, may suffer.
Allowing courts to consider the educational context of deseg
regation remedies carries with it many dangers in terms of the ex
panded role of the courts in education policymaking. Professor
Hain's enlightening study of desegregation 49 in Detroit makes this
abundantly clear. After the Supreme Court ruled that a metropoli
tan remedy for overwhelmingly black Detroit was not constitution
ally required in view of the nature of the de jure segregation, the
NAACP sought a Detroit only racial balance remedy in which each
school in the district would have a 65 to 35 ratio of black to white
students. 50 This plan would have involved the reassignment of
some 100,000 students51 out of a school population of approxi
mately a quarter of a million students. The board of education pro
posed a less extensive desegregation remedy. Federal District
Judge DeMascio rejected both plans:
[Judge De Mascio] ... believed desegregation [in majority black
urban districts] only required that blacks be represented in sig
nificant numbers in every school in the district, as evidence they
were no longer excluded. It was not necessary, he believed, for
whites to be as widely distributed. . . . "Equal facilities, inte
grated faculties and meaningful guarantees that every student is
welcome in any school" were, in Judge DeMascio's view, suffi
cient indicia of a desegregated system. 52

The principle ground for the rejection of the NAACP and
board plans is not entirely clear. If racial balance is required as the
remedy for past and/or present discrimination, why should the par
ticular ratio of blacks to whites alter the remedy? If the remedy
was simply one of nondiscrimination and not racial balance, then
neither a token nor a substantial representation of blacks or whites
in each school would be in order. Quite obviously, the court was
influenced by the perceived educational dis utility in racially balan

48.
POLICY

See generally Mishkin, supra note 21. N. GLASER; COURTS AND SOCIAL
(publication forthcoming); D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY

(1977).

49. Pp. 223-308.
50. P.255.
51. [d.
52. P.280.
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cing schools which were already two-thirds blacks. 53 How the court
was able to judge the relative costs and benefits of integration un
der such circumstances and why the consideration of such costs
and benefits are legitimate only in majority black districts is far
from clear. Further, the "welcome mat" theory of equal protection
is strikingly reminiscent of freedom of choice and token representa
tion remedies rejected by the courts in the late 1960's and early
1970's. 54
If educational theorizing was implicit in the rejection of racial
balance remedies, it was made explicit in the remedies actually ap
proved by the court. Without the participation of plaintiffs' counsel
(according to Professor Hain),55 Judge DeMascio proceeded to re
fashion the public educational system in Detroit through a bar
gaining process with the school board. The judge perceived the
need for a stricter discipline code in Detroit, and he proceeded to
write one when the board's code did not live up to his expecta
tions. 56 He was openly critical of the legislatively mandated decen
tralization of the Detroit school system into eight regions. 57 For
reasons perhaps rooted in his own experience, the judge proposed
(no party had) and ordered a major revision of the grade structure.
He preferred that Detroit's students attend kindergarten through
5th grade, 6th through 8th grade, and 9th through 12th grade
schools, rather than the previously prevalent kindergarten through
6th grade, 7th through 9th grade, and 10th through 12th grade sys
tern. 58 The result was that the court's plan moved more students
than the board's plan and "achieved about half as much deseg
regation."59 How much of this had to do with remedying racial
discrimination remains a mystery. More justifiably, DeMascio at
tempted to put teeth into the revamped separate-but-equal doc
trine by requiring various compensatory programs, with particular
emphasis on reading and vocational education. 6o The United States
53. Cf. Calhoun v. Cook, 430 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1975) (majority status of black
students in each school indicates freedom from racial discrimination). Calhoun is dis
cussed by Dean Kalodner at pp. 15-16.
54. See, e.g., Creen v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Raney v. Bd. of
Educ., 391 U.S. 443 (1968); Moses v. Wash. Parish School Bd., 456 F.2d 1285 (5th
Cir. 1972).
55. P.278.
56. P.294.
57. P. 283 n.333.
58. Pp. 286-87. There were numerous exceptions to the Board's K-6, 7-9, 10-12
policy. P. 287.
59. P.284.
60. Pp. 292-94. See generally Yudof, supra note 24.
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Supreme Court, with the grumbling acquiescence of Justice
Powell, affirmed the educational components of the plan and the
lower court's order that the state of Michigan be compelled to con
tribute to the cost of their implementation. 61 The question of stu
dent desegregation remained in the courts, after the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected Judge DeMascio's
"welcome mat" theory of desegregation. 62
After he brilliantly and painstakingly assembled his facts, Pro
fessor Rain is content with a two paragraph summary of the
Detroit litigation. 63 The reader questionably learns that the aban
donment of Detroit by whites is "almost completed," the district
court minimized the inconvenience for whites in his desegregation
plan, and "only inclusion of the suburbs in a desegregation plan"
has the potential for achieving racial balance for Detroit's black stu
dents. Even less pointedly, one learns that "rough, maligned
Detroit has shown a grace more genteel cities might envy. "64 The
first set of conclusions required no case study, and the second con
clusion pretends to substitute civility for theory. There is no
discussion of how negotiated remedies in public interest cases dif
fer from traditional legal remedies. 65 No guidelines are offered to
show when a judge has overstepped his equity powers and when
he is responding responsibly to a difficult situation. There is no
analysis of whether school boards and bureaucracies are more likely
to implement plans requiring specific educational components than
those requiring the dismantling of neighborhood schools. There is
virtually no mention that the majority of Detroit's population is
black and Detroit has a black mayor and school superintendent.
The implications that this black representation might have on the
implementation of desegregation orders are not pursued. 66 Some
how one feels wiser after reading the Detroit case study, but that
wisdom points only to the past and not to the future.
William Marsh makes a convincing case for the existence of
northern style racial discrimination in his Indianapolis study,67 but
misses a superb opportunity to examine the role of social science

61.
62.
(1977).
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
Bradley v. Milliken, 540 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1976), afI'd, 433 U.S. 267
P.306.
[d.
See Chayes, supra note 25; Mishkin, supra note 21.
But see p. 281.
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evidence in the adjudication process. He is content to inform the
reader that the termination of the litigation is not in sight, that no
meaningful plan for desegregation has been adopted, and that
there may be reason for hope in the recent election of a more pro
gressive school board. 68 The Mount Vernon study69 is interesting
in that it focuses on state courts and education agencies as the fo
rums for desegregation issues. Its conclusion that civil rights advo
cates erred in relying on the state commissioner of education and
the state courts for a desegregation remedy is plausible, but I am
suspicious about whether it is generalizable. 70
Perhaps the best case study in the book is Professor Kirp's re
search on desegregation in San Francisco. Kirp at least articulates
the traditional liberal position on race and schools:
[Superintendent] Spear's perception of the changing racial com
position of San Francisco's public schools did not entail any dis
tinct administrative reaction. His attitude [in 1960] reflected the
classic liberal position: race or other group attributes should be
irrelevant, individual characteristics controlling, with respect to
any institutional decision. Thus, while the district's hiring policy
"emphasizes the selection of the best qualified teachers available
. . . ," and its educational policy stressed quality education
geared to the capabilities of the individual student, the racial im
plications of such policies constituted an inappropriate line of in
quiry. . . . There existed no official statistics to document the
impact of . . . [black migration to previously white areas on the
racial composition of particular schools]. 71

The traditional liberal wisdom may appear naive to some, racist to
others, and of continuing vitality to still others,72 but it is clear that
its rejection makes the task of achieving racial justice enormously
more complex. Complexity only arises through the accompanying
disagreement over the goals of school and race policies and laws,
and the need to determine how, when, and why race may be taken
into account. Professor Kirp's awareness of this complexity greatly
augments his analysis of desegregation in San Francisco. His world
does not neatly divide into evil-doers who oppose racial balance
remedies and do-gooders who favor it. Fault is not easily assigned,
68.
69.
70.
28, 130
71.
72.
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particularly when institutional and political factors are taken into
account.
The Kirp study elucidates several themes which render his
collection of facts more intelligible. Professor Kirp does not assume
a monolithic black or white community committed to a single race
ideology,73 and hence he is not surprised to find tensions over pol
icy within constituent groups and institutions. Indeed, he recog
nizes that means and ends are frequently in a state of flux, and that
permanent solutions will prove evasive:
Issues as volatile as segregation are never resolved in any perma
nent fashion. Organizations whose primary concern is the fur
therance of minority civil rights do not admit to final successes;
they recognize only the stage-by-stage resolution of continuing
controversies, disputes . . . are constantly changing, the de
mands constantly expanding, the inequality about which objec
tion is voiced constantly becoming less readily detectable. 74

The game changes over time. Equal facilities for blacks and whites
may constitute an enormous civil rights victory at one point in time
and a tremendous defeat at another. Successful resistance to the
closing of a black neighborhood school may be a feather in the cap
of a black politician on one day and a decisive defeat for integration
on another. Racist white politicians may vow to resist freedom of
choice plans to the point of disobeying court orders, only to em
brace such plans in the name of parental choice and neighborhood
schools at a later date. Much of the posturing and gamemanship,
despite the grave consequences for black and white students, has a
symbolic quality, and once a symbolic victory has been achieved,
the pressures for change may abate: "[The realities of deseg
regation may matter less than the willingness of powerful white of
ficials] . . . to defer to the wishes of the civil rights groups . . . .
Once the symbolic victory had been secured, through the Johnson
decision, most civil rights activists lost their interest in what hap
pened."75
Professor Kirp notes other factors which desegregation com
mentators frequently overlook. The endless studies conducted by
interest groups, experts, and school professionals may be a form of
buying time because they are"studies in lieu of decisions. "76 Plain
73.
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tiffs in desegregation cases may not only lack the resources to for
mulate and monitor desegregation plans, a point well made by
Dean Kalodner, but they may lack the will to do SO.77 If the plan is
promulgated by the board of education, it is the board that is put
on the defensive, and plaintiffs may continue to pick away at the
official position. Professor Kirp, however, fails to note a time
honored rule of organizational politics: he who drafts the proposals
frequently is able to confine the scope of discussion and limit
changes to relatively inconsequential matters. On the other hand,
he is mindful of the cardinal rule of organizational and bureaucratic
behavior; incompetence may carry the day.78 Too frequently, lack
of normative commitment to the court's decision and racial preju
dice are words used to describe organizational responses that can
best be understood in the light of the organization's utter inability
to do what courts have required. Devising new school attendance
boundaries, selecting new building construction sites, meeting the
transportation needs of an integrated school district, and a myriad
of other tasks may strain the abilities (and resources) of professional
education administrators.
Finally, Professor Kirp identifies the paradox that goes far in
explaining all eight case studies in LIMITS OF JUSTICE: "Litigation
represents an end-run around the political process of dispute reso
lution. That is both its strength, from the advocates' viewpoint, and
its limitation. "79 Constitutional litigation in the desegregation cases
is an attempt to appeal the decisions of majoritarian institutions to
judicial ones better insulated from the voices of the majority. In
the realm of broad social reform, courts must listen to and take ac
count of those voices if judicial orders are to be obeyed. A change
in forums that results in a decisional outcome perceived as favora
ble to a racial minority is undone at the implementation stage pre
cisely because of the institutional characteristics of that forum. A
strength at the point of decision becomes a weakness at the point
of implementation.
If the courts are to succeed in desegregation cases, there are
three choices. First, they may conSistently and coherently articu
late and defend their decisions and hope to succeed by moral per
suasion over an extended period of time. The Supreme Court has
gone far in dashing this hope by its inability to be consistent and
77.
78.
79.
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coherent since its metropolitan desegregation ruling in 1974. 80 Sec
ond, the courts may temper their decisions in the light of popular
concerns. Perhaps one may accurately describe Judge DeMascio's
idiosyncratic response to segregation in Detroit as falling loosely
within this category. The problem is that such moderation may un
dermine the goal of racial justice in the schools. Surely, civil rights
groups might prefer to fight for implementation of a far-reaching
decree than to acquiesce in the formulation of remedies, perceived
as meaningless, which may be easily implemented. Third, the
courts may consciously attempt to probe the causes of popular,
elite, and institutional opposition or noncooperation in deseg
regation orders and to tailor their decrees and processes accord
ingly.
LIMITS OF JUSTICE is a first cut at the third type of judicial
approach. The difficulties of devising an efficacious strategy, how
ever, loom large. My own suspicion is that class conflicts have
been subsumed under the category of racial discrimination in the
school cases. Whites do not so much fear integration with blacks as
integration with poor blacks. They perceive socioeconomic integra
tion as a threat to the quality of education and as an invitation to
school violence. Unless whites can be disabused of these notions,
real or imagined, or unless the correlation between race and pov
erty is sharply reduced, racial balance (if that is the appropriate
constitutional goal) is likely to be strenuously resisted. If the courts
are not to be charged with the broadest responsibility for curing
perceived unfairness in the distribution of wealth, they must work
at changing attitudes. But these problems of the mind are compli
cated by the ineptness of school bureaucracies in assuaging these
concerns. This explains the new "American dilemma," so ably de
scribed by Professor Omeld: Americans increasingly favor integra
tion in the abstract but forcefully resist the only realistic means of
achieving it, the transportation of students from their segregated
neighborhoods to integrated schools. 81 Neighborhood segregation is
associated with wealth differentials, discrimination, taste, and other
. factors. 82 If, by some wave of the magician's wand, neighborhoods
in urban areas were to be integrated, the resultant school integra
tion would strike many as "natural." The underlying reason is that
80. See generally Yudof, supra note 24.
81. C. ORFIELD, MUST WE Bus? SEGREGATED
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student bodies would be relatively racially heterogeneous but more
economically homogeneous.
Without the ability to effect wealth redistribution or neighbor
hood integration, the task for the courts is one of persuasion in
which the persuasive qualities of judicial opinions alone are quite
limited. How may courts devise new strategies for communication
and persuasion which will lead to implementation of their decrees?
One thinks of publicity campaigns, in-service training for teachers,
meetings with parents, workshops for administrators, and so on. 83
Even if these and other strategies can be identified and made to
work, a matter easily disputed, their use would raise profound
questions about the specific role of courts and the general role of
governments in leading public opinion. 84 Propaganda, truth, and
education are in the eyes of the beholder.85 One person's moral
leadership is another's brainwashing. Democratic government is
rooted in the ability and opportunity of each citizen to make and
express judgments on matters of public concern and to use those
judgments to influence government institutions. 86 If government
crosses the line from education and leadership to an "engineered"
consent, it ceases to be legitimate in democratic theory and fact.
This is no less true of the judicial branch than of the executive or
legislative branches. Furthermore, accommodating the politics of
persuasion to the traditional model of adjudication may defY even
the creative impulses of the Kirps and Kalodners of the legal com
munity. If future studies of desegregation cases are to be taken se
riously, these are precisely the types of questions of theory that
must be addressed.
83. An extensive public relations campaign involving widespread press, ra
dio, and television coverage, personal appearances by members of the board,
the superintendent, and new principal, was set up to inform parents of the
magnet school concept and to encourage them to send their children. Mail
ings to families with eligible sixth-grade children began....
P. 161.
84. See generally Yudof, Government Expression and the First Amendment, in
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